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This study empirically investigates the transposition patterns of EU directives in all 15 
member states and in six major sectors of the economy with a view on analysing the political-
economic reasons behind sector and national differences in the legal transposition instruments 
used. In particular, we model the influence of both national sector importance and 
governmental constellations on the ratio of primary to totally transposed EU directives. We 
find that government strength and net EU receipts negatively affect the ratio of primary to 
total transpositions. Economic sector size plays a positive significant role for primary 
transposition ratios. However, the direction of the effect changes if we control for other sector 
characteristics, i.e. sector lobbying potential and technicality. 
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1 Introduction
European integration does not only depend on the European Union’s (EU)
decision-making ability but also on the correct, complete and timely imple-
mentation of EU-decisions in the member states. The latter aspect of putting
EU-law into national practice is all the more relevant as legislative activity
in the EU is marked by a clear centralizing trend over the last decade. To-
day, EU decision-making touches almost every policy area and EU legislative
activity amounts to more than 15 000 binding European acts in force1. This
throws up such important questions as the following: What happens to this
bulk of EU legislation in the member states?
At ﬁrst sight, this issue might appear trivial and self-explanatory as mem-
ber states have legally obliged themselves to transpose and implement EU
directives in a complete, correct and timely manner according to articles
249, III and 10, I of the EC Treaty (ECT). However, national implementa-
tion practices reveal a diﬀerent picture as the above quote by Commission
president Jos´ e Manuel Barroso’s spokesperson illustrates.
Given the discrepancy between implementation theory and reality, our
paper tries to shed empirical light on the actual implementation patterns
across member states and policy areas. We thereby focus on EU directives
only. Compared to other types of secondary, that is non-Treaty, EU law such
as regulations or decisions, the implementation procedure for EU directives
diﬀers in that EU directives ﬁrst need to be transposed, i.e. transcribed
into national legislation, before they are legally eﬀective and can be put into
practice by national administrations, courts and agencies. Regarding their
1See Alesina et al. (2005): Tables 4 and 7 on the total number of passed regulations,
directives and decisions per period and the total number of these types of legislation in
force between 1971 and 2000.
2transposition, member state governments are generally free to decide upon
the legal instrument(s) as long as the respective legal device(s) serve(s) to ful-
ﬁl the directive’s general objectives and meet(s) the required deadline. One
can thereby broadly distinguish between primary and secondary national
transposition devices. Primary transposition instrument(s) refer to all na-
tional legal devices requiring a parliamentary majority decision. Secondary
transposition devices comprise all other national legal instruments, usually
mere administrative acts.
According to this set up, we conceive the government’s transposition de-
cision as a two-step process: In the ﬁrst step, the government may decide
whether it is generally willing to transpose a particular directive or not. As-
suming a government’s willingness to transpose, the question then becomes,
in the second step, whether to transpose via primary or secondary legislative
devices, i.e. whether to get involved into a national parliamentary debate or
not. This second step of the government’s transposition decision is exactly
what our paper aims to analyse. In particular, we intend to investigate the
de facto ratios of primary to total transposition notiﬁcations for EU direc-
tives adopted between the Single European Act and today. This question is
highly relevant from a normative political point of view and complements the
debate on the EU’s ’democratic deﬁcit’ by investigating in how far national
parliaments are excluded from the legislative process when it comes to the
transposition of EU directives?
For our empirical assessment, we have constructed a unique dataset com-
prising political-economic indicators and various measures of transposition
based on the member states’ notiﬁcations of transposed EU-legislation, as
provided in CELEX Sector 7 by the European Commission. Our dataset not
only covers the EU-15 member states on an aggregate level but also six major
sectors of their economies and it ranges from 1986 to 2002. This allows us to
investigate the member states’ transposition performances in a novel fashion,
namely with a dynamic cross-country cross-sector view. The sector perspec-
tive thereby allows us to consider the speciﬁc content of a directive, i.e.
the policy area it touches upon, as an additional explanatory factor besides
the frequently hypothesised macro-level politico-institutional and economic
eﬀects. We ﬁnd that three factors matter for explaining primary transpo-
sition ratios: political-institutional constellations, sector characteristics and
EU-membership beneﬁts. In particular, governmental control of the parlia-
mentary agenda and net EU receipts have a negative eﬀect on the ratio of
primary to total transpositions. Economic sector size seems to play a positive
signiﬁcant role for primary transposition ratios. However, the direction of
the eﬀect changes when we control for other sector characteristics, i.e. sector
lobbying potential and technicality.
3Our paper is divided into six parts: After a brief discussion of the relevant
literature in section 2, we discuss our theoretical approach in section 3. Here,
we deﬁne the broader theoretical framework. With a view to modelling the
transposition of EU directives, we outline the implementation process for the
case of EU directives and specify the government’s decision path after it has
received the directives coming from Brussels. Based on national governments’
utilities we derive testable hypotheses about the expected ratios of primary
to total transposed directives across member states and policy areas. Section
4 draws up our research design. Starting with discussing our data structure,
we explain our choice of policy areas before turning to descriptive ﬁgures
of our dependent variable and describe our econometric model and method.
Finally, we present our empirical results in section 5 and summarize our main
conclusions in section 6.
2 Related literature
Two strands of the political science literature deal with the transposition
and implementation of EU directives, i.e. the issues of Europeanization and
compliance, respectively. Europeanization is thereby deﬁned as ’the process
of inﬂuence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’
policies and political and administrative structures’ (Heritier (1995)). Com-
pliance generally refers to the fulﬁlment of EU legislation in the member
states.
So far, comparative studies using econometric tools in the area of Eu-
ropeanization mainly concentrate on the timeliness of transposing EU di-
rectives. Prominent examples are Mastenbroek (2003), Kaeding (2005) and
K¨ onig, Luetgert & M¨ ader (2005) who investigate the political-economic fac-
tors underlying transposition delays from diﬀerent perspectives. Whereas
Mastenbroek (2003) focuses on Dutch transposition delays for 229 directives
enacted between 1995 and 1998 using various data sources mainly provided
by the Dutch government, Kaeding (2005) concentrates on one particular
policy area (transport). He particularily analyses the probability of delay
across ﬁve member states, namely Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, the
UK and Greece. In contrast to Mastenbroek (2003), Kaeding’s (2005) data
stems from the EU Commission’s online-database CELEX. It contains the
transposition deﬁcit for all 106 directives of the transport acquis ranging
from 1957 to 2004. Mastenbroek’s (2003) and Kaeding’s (2005) analyses
of survival- and cross-section logit models both show that EU-level factors
such as the time remaining until the transposition deadline, the initiating
EU institution or the applied EU decision-making procedure, inﬂuence the
4timing of transposition. Kaeding’s (2005) study further reveals that a di-
rective’s overall level of complexity and the overall amount of EU legislation
waiting for transposition both signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect delay. With
respect to national factors of inﬂuence, both authors demonstrate that it is
the type of legal instrument used (i.e. law, decree, regulation or circulair)
rather than the number of reported transposition instruments which signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuences transposition delay. However, whereas Mastenbroek (2003)
ﬁnds a strong eﬀect of the ministry in charge, Kaeding (2005) does not.
Additionally, in Kaeding’s (2005) analysis the number of governmental coali-
tion parties plays a signiﬁcant role for the likelihood of timely transposition.
K¨ onig et al. (2005) also employ CELEX-based data for their empirical in-
vestigation of the timeliness of transposition. Compared to Kaeding (2005),
however, they apply a more comprehensive approach as their dataset contains
not only transport directives, but all 1,592 directives adopted between 1984
and 2002 with the respective transposition measures for the ﬁfteen ‘old’ EU
member states. Rather than just looking at a selection of particular mem-
ber states they look at all EU-15 member states. Moreover, they explore
sector diﬀerences in transposition timing across four CELEX policy areas,
namely agriculture, energy and environment, internal market and common
rules. Apart from Mastenbroek (2003) and Kaeding (2005), they also include
EU-level and national-level economic factors, such as the amount of net-EU
payments and value added shares. They further incorporate preference mea-
sures grasping the level of conﬂict on the EU- and the national stage, such as
the ‘sector speciﬁc core based on maximum distance between member state
governments’ and the ‘sector speciﬁc core based on the maximum distance
between parties represented in national parliaments’. The results of their
preliminary Heckman selection (probit-probit) model reveal that EU-level
conﬂict inﬂuences negatively while national conﬂict positively inﬂuences the
probability to transpose in the selection equation. The probability of delayed
transposition in the second step of the Heckman procedure is positively and
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the number of notiﬁed transposition measures, net-
EU receipts and sector value added shares. Besides these, K¨ onig et al. (2005)
ﬁnd out that more pluralist systems lead to a signiﬁcantly higher probability
for delayed transposition.
The compliance literature, deals with infringement procedures initiated
by the Commission and litigated in co-operation with the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) against member states failing to implement or ‘to comply’ with
EU-law. Thus, compliance studies address similar research questions as found
in the Europeanization literature, but use a diﬀerent dependent variable for
measuring national performances of coping with EU-law. Instead of relying
on member state transposition notiﬁcations, quantitative compliance stud-
5ies count member states’ expositions to EU infringement procedures. Two
especially relevant examples of applied quantitative work within this strand
of literature are B¨ orzel, Hofmann & Panke (2005) and Perkins & Neumayer
(2007). B¨ orzel et al. (2005) test two competing hypotheses about national
non-compliance. On the one hand, the ’management theory hypothesis’ sup-
poses non-compliance to be involuntary and mainly due to the lacking ca-
pacity (i.e. administrative ressources and public support) of a member state.
The ’enforcement theory hypothesis’ assumes national non-compliance to be
fully intended. In particular, the voting power of a member state vis ` a vis
the EU-institutions is assumed to be the dominant factor underlying a gov-
ernment’s motivation to comply. Their probit- and survival-analyses uncover
that both anticipated factors are statistically relevant for explaining cross-
country variances of non-compliance. Like K¨ onig et al. (2005), B¨ orzel et al.
(2005) further control for policy-speciﬁc eﬀects and also ﬁnd strong empirical
evidence for their explanatory power. However, B¨ orzel et al. (2005) are so
far unable to identify exactly which policy-related aspects are at work.
Perkins & Neumayer (2007) follow a theoretically diﬀerent approach which
seems especially promising. In contrast to previous works in the compliance
literature, the authors take on a political-economic perspective assessing the
beneﬁts of compliance for a member state. Applying negative binomial es-
timations for their count dependent variable, i.e. the number of national
expositions to infringement procedures, Perkins and Neumayer (2007) ﬁnd
overall support for their main argument that national levels of compliance
are inﬂuenced by the beneﬁts a particular member state derives from the EU,
both politically and economically. In particular, the level of intra-EU trade
dependence as well as well as per capita voting power in EU institutions
are negatively correlated with legal infringements. Surprisingly, but in line
with K¨ onig et al. (2005), Perkins & Neumayer (2007) ﬁnd a member state’s
compliance record to decrease with rising net-EU receipts.
Besides recent advances, what lacks so far in both discussed literature
strands, is quantitative empirical work on the kind of legal transposition in-
strument(s) used by the national governments. The aforementioned papers
of Kaeding (2005) and Mastenbroek (2003) merely point to the eﬀect of the
legal instrument used on transposition delay. We ask, however, directly what
political-economic factors will make a government opt for primary transpo-
sition devices given it is willing to transpose. Although neglected in the
literature so far, this question seems highly relevant from a normative politi-
cal point of view. First, the national balance of power could be threatened if,
through the process of EU-law transposition, member state executives would
administer more and more legislative competences to the cost of national
parliaments. This would be the case if national executives would preferably
6choose secondary transposition devices for a generally increasing number of
EU directives. It would be interesting to ask for future research whether EU
integration has lead to a ’democratic deﬁcit’ on the national arena? However,
analysing the possible eﬀects behind a government’s chosen mode of transpo-
sition is far beyond the scope of this paper. Our study aims to provide a ﬁrst
attempt to directly address the national transposition modes, i.e. the de facto
ratios of primary to total transpositions respectively. But this is not the only
contribution we claim to make. With respect to our research design, we fur-
ther try to extend on the cross-sector perspectives addressed in K¨ onig et al.
(2005) and B¨ orzel et al. (2005). In doing so, we employ a three-dimensional
econometric model grasping not only country- but also sector-speciﬁc eﬀects
across ﬁve major sectors of the respective national economies. Looking at
transposition performances across policy areas thereby allows us to consider
the policy-contents of EU directives. As we suppose that both aspects, policy
and polity, play a signiﬁcant role for a government’s transposition rationale, a
cross-sector research design appears especially important in order to prevent
selection bias. A comparative policy design further avoids getting blind-eyed
by the particularities of a single policy area.
3 Towards modelling transposition
3.1 Theoretical set up: the government’s transposition
decision
Looking at the transposition framework in greater detail, three diﬀerent types
of EU legislation may be distinguished: decisions, regulations and directives.
All three are nationally binding2. However, the ﬁrst two come directly into
eﬀect in the member states without the need for any national legislation. In
contrast, directives must be transposed, that is legally translated and written
into national legislation, before the respective national administrative bodies
can act upon them (see Art. 249 III ECT on the obligation of the member
states to transpose and implement directives). In the case of non-compliance
by failing either to transpose or to put EU law into practice they risk being
sent a letter of formal notice by the Commission as the “guardian of the
Treaty” (Art. 211 ECT). Member states can also be oﬃcially sentenced by
the ECJ, the latter being the last instance of the infringement procedure
2Two further types of secondary EU legislation, namely recommendations and opinions,
are left aside here since they are not binding for the member states.
7(Art. 226 and 228 ECT)3 Further, member states can be held liable to the
European citizens if they do not implement EU directives on time or in an
incomplete manner (Streinz (2001)).
Regarding the national legal instruments used for transposition, direc-
tives may impose speciﬁc implementation conditions and objectives, but not
the member states’ transposition instrument(s) directly. In other words, for-
mally, the choice of transposition instrument(s) remains with the national
governments, leaving national technical and legal restrictions aside. In com-
mon judicial practice, however, an EU directive may become directly appli-
cable for a member state once the deadline for implementation has passed
and certain legal conditions are met. Yet, according to Streinz (2005:158f),
in the case of delay it unfolds a so called ’eﬀet utile’ only if:
1. the directive is formulated in such a way that individual rights can di-
rectly be derived from it, meaning that it does not leave any contextual
discretion to the national judicial agencies (self-executive character of
a directive), and
2. the content of a directive does not harm a citizen.
In the following we will restrict ourselves to EU directives rather than
to EU decisions or regulations. This is for two reasons. First, only for the
case of EU directives the issue of transposing EU law into national legislation
does arise. EU decisions and regulations come into force directly upon their
adoption on the EU level. Second, we ﬁnd the question on the government’s
choice of transposition instruments to be empirically relevant and not to be
a mere theoretical artifact. As pointed out above, only under very special
judicial conditions may EU directives unfold a ’direct eﬀect’ in a member
state.
Summing up, in the case of EU directives we understand the national
implementation procedure as two-fold. It comprises ﬁrst the process of trans-
posing EU law into national legislation. The second part is the actual “im-
plementation” in the sense that national or regional public agencies such as
the police, administrative bureaus, oﬃces and courts put the transposed di-
rectives into practice. In this paper, our focus lies on the transposition of
3According to Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber (2005) the whole infringement proce-
dure comprises four stages: 1. Letter of Formal Notice, 2. Reasoned Opinion, 3. Referral
to the ECJ (all initiated by Commission), and 4. Judgment by the ECJ. They also point
to newer ’internal procedure’ documents of the Commission that even allow for additional,
non-legal and more promising instruments to bring member state behavior into line with
EU law (see COM [2002] 725). For a detailed description of the diﬀerent stages of the in-
fringement procedure and its eﬀects on implementation in the member states, see Falkner
et al. (2005).
8Figure 1: Two-fold transposition decision of a member government (G)
EU directives as starting point of the national implementation procedure.
With respect to the legal instrument(s) used for transposition, we suppose
the government (G) to follow a two-step decision path as illustrated in 1 be-
low. In the ﬁrst step, G chooses whether it is generally willing to transpose
and implement a particular directive or whether it prefers to not transpose
at all or to delay. Then, given it has decided to transpose and implement,
G has the possibility to select the appropriate transposition instrument in
the second step of the decision path. It may thereby opt for primary or
secondary legislative devices.
According to our deﬁnition, primary legislative devices comprise all na-
tional legislation in the sense of ”laws”. In other words, we deﬁne primary
legislation as national legal instruments which in some way have to be ap-
proved by the respective national parliament. All other national legislative
actions that can directly be adopted by the member states’ executives are
referred to as secondary legislation.
This categorization into primary and secondary transposition instruments
may appear rather broad given that the number and types of available legal
instruments vary considerably across EU member states. Take for instance
Ireland, which notiﬁed six diﬀerent legal devices to the Commission out of
which only one requires a parliamentary majority4. Whereas in Germany, we
count 17 notiﬁed transposition instruments out of which we classiﬁed two as
primary in CELEX Sector 75. However, comparing and categorizing all pos-
4We collect the following notiﬁed transposition devices for Ireland: Act (primary),
Regulation (secondary (sec.)), Order (sec.), Notice (sec.), Circular (sec.) and Resolution
(sec.).
5We collect the following notiﬁed transposition devices for Germany: Bundesgesetz
9sible national legal devices across 15 member states is a tough judicial task
which goes beyond our political-economic perspective6. Thus, we leave it
with the aforementioned classiﬁcation as it allows for the theoretically inter-
esting diﬀerentiation between mere bureaucratic acts (secondary legislation)
and laws that need the approval of parliament (primary legislation). From
a legal point of view, it ought to be mentioned that, a few of the numerous
national legal devices do not fall in either of the two categories. Take, for in-
stance, the German ”Verordnung”: it generally requires a law that authorizes
the Federal government, single ministers or the L¨ ander executives to adopt
it. However, under certain conditions and for speciﬁc policy areas it may
additionally need the approval of the upper chamber, the ”Bundesrat” (see
Art. 80 GG). Further, we ought to keep in mind for the interpretation of our
results, that some states may have passed special legislative rules for dealing
with EU law. Ireland and the UK, for instance, have done so in the Euro-
pean Community Acts of 1972 providing the general power for implementing
Community obligations by means of secondary legislation. Related to this,
Ireland and the UK each have passed Statutory Instruments Acts which en-
able their parliaments to delegate legislation to the ministry in charge. For
some of the Statutory Instruments, the British and the Irish Houses of Par-
liament have preserved their rights to annul Statutory Instruments passed by
the executive within a given time frame. Thus, although the transposition
of EU law via Statutory Instruments require delegation by parliament, they
count as secondary legislation of the UK and Ireland as they have ﬁnally
been passed by the ministry in charge. In our dataset, we cannot account for
these judicially unclear cases, but restrict primary legislation to only those
national legislative devices in the sense of national ’laws’ that always require
a majority decision of the lower chamber.
(primary), Landesgesetz (primary), Bundesverordnung (federal, sec.), Landesverordnung
(L¨ ander, sec.), Bekanntmachung (federal, sec.), Bekanntmachung (L¨ ander, sec.), Verwal-
tungsvorschrift(en) und andere Vorschriften (federal, sec.), Verwaltungsvorschrift(en) und
andere Vorschriften (L¨ ander, sec.), Anordnung (Reichsanzeiger, sec.), Anordnung (DDR,
sec.), Anordnung (Regulierungsbeh¨ orden, sec.), Erlaß (federal, sec.), Erlaß (L¨ ander), Run-
derlaß (federal, sec.), Runderlaß (L¨ ander, sec.), Rundschreiben (sec.), Anweisung (sec.).
6See Trantas (1995) for a more comprehensive research guide to ‘Comparing Legislative
Instruments Across Nations’.
103.2 Assessing the government’s (G) utility: costs and
beneﬁts of primary transposition
3.2.1 Transaction costs (TC)
If a government chooses to go through parliament in transposing a directive
coming from Brussels, several diﬃculties may lie upon its way. Obstacles to
parliamentary decision-making may thereby vary across countries and sec-
tors, but can generally be seen as the transaction costs (TC) of primary
legislation. D¨ oring & Hallerberg (2004) refer to two main factors determin-
ing the TC of the dynamics, i.e. the speed, of the legislative process in their
recent compendium on the passage of legislation across Western Europe.
First, country-speciﬁc institutional constraints, such as the number of veto
players (vps), make the passage of legislation by parliament costly for the
government as opposition possibilities increase. Tsebelis (1995) elaborates
this eﬀect in his frequently cited veto player theory. Regarding transposi-
tion, a positive eﬀect of vps on transposition delay has so far been approved
in the empirical studies of Kaeding (2005), K¨ onig et al. (2005) and Mas-
tenbroek (2003). Second, D¨ oring & Hallerberg (2004) argue that as time
is scarce in parliamentary life, legislation always involves opportunity costs
(OC) for re-election seeking politicians. Thus, additional TC may arise from
the ability of minorities to inﬂict opportunity costs on the parliamentary
majority. We will account for the ability of minority groups to inﬂict OC on
the government by considering sector-speciﬁc lobbing eﬀects in the section
below. For now, let us hypothesize about the inﬂuence of vps on the legal
kind of transposition instrument(s):
H1 The greater the number of veto players within a governmental system,
the less the ratio of primary to total transposed directives. (-)
In the same volume D¨ oring (2004) further tries to link time constraint,
the level of controversy entailed in a particular bill and the government’s
control of the parliamentary agenda to the introduction of restrictive rules
by the government. He thereby refers to Henning (1995) and D¨ oring (1995)
who have formulated and tested a formal model explaining legislative out-
put across Europe. More particularly, Henning (1995) assumes a majority
government to be the monopolist of political decisions in a parliamentary
system and derives the somewhat contra-intuitive theoretical prediction that
the more a government, due to time-saving prerogatives of agenda control,
is principally able to push many legislative measures through, the fewer,
yet more controversial bills it is actually inclined to submit to parliament.
Empirical tests by D¨ oring (1995) ’approve’ this proposition. We agree that
11the power distribution in executive-legislative relations plays a crucial role
not only for explaining legislative outputs but also for analyzing govern-
ments’ preferred transposition modes. However, intuitively and from a TC
perspective, we argue that for weaker governments the costs of transposing
via parliament are generally higher as their chances of pushing a particular
bill through the legislative process appear smaller. In particular, coalition
governments encompassing a large number of parties appear more prone to
inner-executive and legislative opposition as each party may be seen as addi-
tional veto player according to Kreppel (1997). As we are unable to decide on
the expected eﬀect direction theoretically, our statistical analysis will have
to reveal whether the argument of Henning (1995) and D¨ oring (1995) in H2a
holds for explaining transposition modes.
H2a The stronger G relative to the opposition, the less the ratio of primary
to total transposed directives. (-)
H2b The larger the number of coalition parties, i.e. the greater the frac-
tionalisation of a government coalition, the less the ratio of primary to
total transposed directives. (-)
Regarding the level of controversy entailed in a particular bill, D¨ oring
(2004) argues that for G the electoral utility of a controversal bill relative to
a consensual one is higher. Underlying this argument is a statement of Olsen
(1980) that given the government can determine the agenda it will use the
parliament for those matters that it considers most important and wishes to
symbolize to the whole population. Assuming that economically important
directives are more controversial in the sense that they foster parliamentary
or inner-coalition opposition to a higher degree than less important directives
thus leads to the following hypothesis from a sector perspective on transpo-
sition mode:
H3 The greater the economic importance of a sector, the greater the ratio of
primary to total transposition. (+)
Further, the timing of transposition within the policy cycle may play a
crucial role for governments preferences on transposition mode. Generally,
as shown by D¨ oring (2004), marginal costs of additional bills passing par-
liament tend to increase towards the end of an election period. The raise
in marginal costs depends, however, on the controversy level of a particular
piece of legislation. We accordingly hypothesize with respect to G’s preferred
transposition mode:
12H4 The closer the transposition decision is to the end of an election period,
the less the ratio of primary to total transposed directives.
We expect this eﬀect to be even stronger in the case of controversial
directives, i.e. economically important directives.
Assessing the costs of primary transposition from an economic perspec-
tive, market ineﬃciencies may arise if EU directives are transposed and im-
plemented in an uncoordinated way among member states. This applies to
the kind of transposition instrument as well as to uncoordinated timing or
delays. With respect to timing, choosing primary transposition devices thus
appears economically costly for a government. This may particularly be the
case for directives touching upon technical issues, which is in sectors such as
transport or environment. Thinking e.g. of the construction of a uniform
railway system, a quick and coeval harmonization across all member states
would clearly bear economic advantages in these areas as intra-EU trade
would be facilitated. Hypothesis 5 mirrors this proposition accordingly.
H5 In rather technical sectors, the ratio of primary to total transposed di-
rectives is smaller.
3.2.2 Lobbying
If an EU directive passes parliament during transposition, not only internal
but also opposition external to the law-making process increases by lobbying
activities that target parliamentary legislation. The passage of EU legisla-
tion in national parliaments oﬀers more time and opportunities for lobbyists
to take action on EU laws on behalf of their constituencies. Politicians then
have to weigh the special interests of a minority group against the welfare of
the median voter. The ability of minority groups to inﬂict OC on politicians
thereby depends on certain systemic or policy-speciﬁc features. Again, as
stated in H2b, coalition governments seem particularly vulnerable to oppo-
sition by lobby groups as lobby costs decrease with the number of parties
involved in the government (see Grossman & Helpman (2001)). Regarding
policy areas, we suppose lobby groups to be mainly active in sectors for which
interests are relatively easy to organize, meaning sectors which are small in
group size and pursue clear-cut group interests according to Olson’s theory
(1957). Thus, in addition to H2b, we hypothesize that:
H6 The more a sector is subject to lobbyism, the less a government opts for
primary transposition devices. (-)
13Given the manifold political-economic costs for a government G to trans-
pose via parliament, it is not surprising that the overall primary transposition
ratios are rather low (see ﬁgures below). What, however, may make G still
opt for primary transposition? Are there any systematic politico-economic
or sector-speciﬁc beneﬁts that help explain the observed cross-country cross-
sector variations in primary transposition ratios?
3.2.3 ’Better regulation’ beneﬁts
Better, that is more detailed and concrete, administrative instructions insert
positive microeconomic eﬀects as they prevent strategic misuse and misinter-
pretation by ﬁrms. Aware of these eﬀects, the Commission has proposed a
new better regulation package in March 2005 in order to improve the quality
of new legislation and existing rules on the EU- as well as on the national
level. It accordingly argues that ”common rules across all Member States
help business and can lower costs” 7. Further, in her Communication to the
Council and the EP on the Lisbon Strategy the Commission states:
”Better regulation has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the framework con-
ditions for economic growth, employment and productivity. By improving the
quality of legislation, it creates the right incentives for business, cutting un-
necessary costs and removing obstacles to adaptation and innovation. The
measures foreseen in the ‘better regulation’ initiatives by the Commission and
the Council Presidencies need to be implemented rapidly”8.
Assuming primary legislation to generally be more elaborated and thus
to guarantee more precise and detailed rules relative to secondary acts, G
would accordingly have clear macroeconomic incentives to opt for transposi-
tion via parliament. From a sector perspective, this should especially be the
case in economically important or rather technical sectors where only precise
implementation rules secure the functioning of the Common Market. Thus,
H3 would further be strengthened by the better regulation argument, but
the anticipated negative eﬀect of sector technicality in H5 would partly be
oﬀset. Therefore, we cannot be sure about the expected eﬀect direction in
H5 for our statistical analysis.
7EU Commission (2006): Improve European and national regulation. Retrieved April
12, 2006, from http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/areas/ﬁche03 en.htm.
8COM (2005) 330 ﬁnal: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community
Lisbon Programme, p. 7.
143.2.4 EU-membership beneﬁts
A direct way to assess the economic beneﬁts from EU membership is measur-
ing national ﬁscal transfers from the EU. K¨ onig et al. (2005) have controlled
for the eﬀect of a country’s net EU-receipts on transposition timeliness and
found a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the delay probability of directives. Fur-
ther, Perkins & Neumayer (2007) develop a theoretical argument on the
inﬂuence of net EU-receipts on infringement cases. However, against their
proposition, and in line with B¨ orzel et al. (2005) they discover a positive eﬀect
of net EU-receipts on infringement submissions. With respect to transposi-
tion modes, we stick to Perkins & Neumayer (2007) and assume that EU ﬁscal
transfers generally lower the costs of complying with EU law. Thus, relative
to net EU-payers, we expect primary transposition to become cheaper for
net EU recipients and hypothesize accordingly:
H7 The more ﬁscal transfers a member state receives from the EU, the higher
the ratio of primary transposition.
4 Data structure
4.1 Data source and classiﬁcation of policy areas
Information for our dependent variable (DV) stems from the European Com-
mission’s online database CELEX Sector 7. It has been extrapolated and
processed by Brooke Luetgert and Lars Maeder according to K¨ onig et al.
(2005). The whole DV dataset contains all of the 2225 adopted EU direc-
tives between 1979 and 2003 together with the notices of all 15 EU member
states to the Commission on their respective transposition instrument(s).
For this paper, we restrict our period of investigation to directives adopted
between the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the lat-
est year available, 2002 respectively. This yields 17*15*5=1275 cases for our
three-dimensional cross-country, cross-sector time series analysis.
Deﬁning the policy areas for which we expect variations on cross-sector
implementation quotas mainly requires solving a practical data problem:
In order to investigate the eﬀects of political-economic characteristics on
primary transposition patterns from a sector perspective, we need to match
the policy area classiﬁcations of our dependent and independent variables.
This requires ﬁtting the EU policy areas deﬁned in Appendix C of the CELEX
Sector 7 database manual with the economic sector division of the OECD
STAN Indicators 2002. Table 4 in the appendix demonstrates in detail how
this amounts to our ﬁnal classiﬁcation of six policy domains. We thereby
15tried to match the sector contents of the various data sources to a maximum
degree but at the same time to prevent overlaps in classes as far as possible9.
For our empirical analysis, we further had to ensure that our classiﬁcation
scheme comprises a minimum number of observations of our dependent vari-
able per sector. This is why we leave aside some of the smaller but frequently
cited sectors such as construction or education.
Thus, turning away from technical drawbacks, our resulting sector divi-
sion contains ﬁve of the major policy areas of a national economy. Value
added shares add up to more than 95%. The aggregated sector classes still
allow for the anticipated variations in sector size and primary transposition
ratios as will be demonstrated in our descriptive analysis below. For the
ease of comparison we further made our selection of policy areas correspond
to the empirical literature on EU policy-making as far as possible. Half of
our policy areas also appear in Alesina et al.’s (2005) classiﬁcation scheme.
Beyond this, further adjustment of the two classiﬁcations for future research
is easily possible as both categorizations are based on the CELEX Appendix
C manual.
4.2 Dependent variable
As pointed out earlier, we strive to explain the government’s choice of trans-
position instrument(s) in our empirical analysis. To do so, we have catego-
rized the various national transposition devices into primary and secondary
legislation. Now, we empirically map the government’s transposition decision
by taking the actual ratios of primary to total transposition notiﬁcations per
member state i, sector j and year t as indicator for our DV COLIij,t (= choice
of legal instrument(s) in member state i and year t for directives touching
upon sector j). Table 5 in the appendix illustrates the construction of our
DV in detail. Underlying COLIij,t, is a directive-based measure COLIr,ijt
which contains information on transposition notiﬁcations by member state
i within sector j in period t for each directive r. The aggregation of this
directive-based measure to our sector-devised DV COLIij,t proceeds in two
steps:
First, we collect information from CELEX Sector 7 for each directive r
on all transposition instruments reported by country i within sector j and
year t. Based on this information we then create the directive-based ratios
of primary to total transpositions referring to COLIr,ijt in Table 5. Next, we
code a dummy variable COLI dr,ijt indicating for each directive r if COLIr,ijt
9Only in the case of classes ﬁve and six the manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum
products and nuclear fuel could not be further separated.
16> 0, i.e. whether the transposition record of a particular directive r includes
at least one primary transposition instrument. Then, in the second step,
we aggregate (by taking the mean) the dummy counts of COLI dr,ijt for all
directives r within a given sector j of country i and year t to a single sector-
based primary to total transposition ratio, that is our DV COLIij,t. Given,
for example, the Commission has passed four directives in 1995 concerning
the transport sector in member state i. For directives 1 and 2, member
state i reported only secondary transposition instruments in 1995 or later.
For directive 3, member state i reported six instruments in 1995 or later
out of which two were primary and four secondary. For directive 4, no
transposition instruments at all have been reported by member state i. Then,
for the transport sector in member state i in 1995, this would yield a primary
transposition ratio of 1/3 or 0.33 (= 0 + 0 + 1(+missing)/[3(+missing)])
for our DV COLIij,t.
Our DV measure contains three peculiarities regarding interpretation:
First, to be precise, the numerater of our DV COLIij,t empirically refers
to the number of a member state’s transposition notiﬁcations (in a given
policy area and a given year) which include at least one primary legislative
transposition instrument, i.e. notiﬁcations which involve at least one major-
ity decision in parliament. The aggregation of a directive-based transposi-
tion measure via our dummy variable COLI d becomes necessary as member
states may report various transposition instruments for a single EU directive.
Simply adding up the transposition instruments reported by member state i
in a given sector j and year t would accordingly neglect that some of these
instruments may refer to the same EU directive.
Second, by construction, a value of 1 for COLIij,t may refer to a trans-
position ratio of 1/1 but also to a ratio of, for instance, 35/35. A value of
zero can accordingly mean two things for COLIij,t. For example, a ratio of
0 for Belgium implies 0 primary out of 30 notiﬁed transposition instruments
in 1994 in the agriculture sector, whereas in 1987 in the transport sector a
ratio of zero for Belgium means 0 primary out of 0 notiﬁcations. In order
to distinguish between these two cases, we code ratios of 0 primary out of 0
notiﬁcations as missing values of COLIij,t. Thus, missing values on our DV
may result for two reasons: either if no directive has been adopted for a given
year, country and sector or if directives lack any transposition notiﬁcations,
implying that they have not been transposed for most cases10. Therefore, by
construction, we actually cannot separate cases missing due to transposition
inactivity by a member state from cases where nothing had to be transposed
10We cannot account for cases in which the member state has actually transposed but
”forgotten” to notify transposition.
17in the ﬁrst place. However, for Finland, Austria and Sweden information on
COLIij,t for the years before their accessions on January 1st 1995 is clearly
lacking out of the second reason. For the paper at hand, this imprecision on
interpreting missing observations appears acceptable as the overall number
of missing observations on our DV still remains manageable (about 300 out
of 1275 observations).
Third, with respect to timing, note that t refers to the year in which
a directive has been oﬃcially drawn up by the EU Commission. This im-
plies that all transposition notiﬁcations referring to a particular directive are
assigned to the year in which this directive has been oﬃcially drawn up in
Brussels. This kind of temporal matching seems adequate for our theoreti-
cal set-up assuming that the government decides on transposition as well as
the adequate transposition instrument(s) immediately after it has received a
directive from Brussels. A given year t thus captures the governmental and
economic constellations at that point in time which we assume crucial for the
government’s transposition decisions. Regarding time, let us further empha-
size that COLIij,t incorporates only, and only those reported transposition
measures which have been notiﬁed after the adoption date of a particular
directive. Practically, one ﬁnds notiﬁcations of transposition instruments
dating back until the early 20th century. Again, this time restriction for
reported transposition measures suits our theoretical set-up, as we seek to
explain the government’s transposition reactions after it has received a di-
rective from Brussels.
The ﬁgures below accordingly display our DV COLIij,t from three dif-
ferent perspectives: pooled mean primary transposition ratios per member
state and per sector, primary transposition records per member state or sec-
tor over time and primary transposition ratios by country, sector and year.
All graphical illustrations immediately reveal diﬀerences in primary transpo-
sition ratios along the three dimensions of our dataset, i.e. across countries
i, sectors j and time t respectively. Complementing the graphs below, Ta-
bles 8, 9 and 10 in the appendix demonstrate detailed summary statistics for
COLIij,t.
From an overall view on primary transposition ratios in the EU in ﬁg-
ures 2 and 3, we see that mean primary transposition ratios are generally
rather small and only diﬀer slightly across time when averaged across coun-
tries and sectors. However, once we compare primary transposition ratios
across sectors and time averaged across member states we get a diﬀerent im-
pression in ﬁgure 5: cross-sector diﬀerences become clear both, in absolute
values and over time. Apparently, primary transposition ratios are highest
for public/ social services and the energy/ environment sector. In addition to

















































Figure 2: Primary transposition ratios per member state, averaged across
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B F D IR
UK A DK FIN




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































P, Agriculture P, Energy/Env. P, Industry P, Transport P, Finance P, Pub./Soc.
SP, Agriculture SP, Energy/Env. SP, Industry SP, Transport SP, Finance SP, Pub./Soc.






Graphs by country code and sector code
Figure 6: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Portugal
(P), Spain (SP) and Sweden (SW)
primary transposition ratios in the energy/environment sector and public/
social services.
Further, take a look at the third kind of ﬁgures grasping the full spec-
trum of variation in our DV from a dynamic cross-country cross-sector view.
Regarding agriculture and transport as frequently cited policy areas (see e.g.
ﬁgures 10 and 8), primary transposition ratios are strikingly high in Ger-
many (D) (mean ratios of .22 and .25 respectively) compared to the other
member states. Except Austria (A) reveals an even higher mean primary
transposition ratio for agriculture (.27). With regard to transport, four of
the ﬁve Scandinavian countries show equally high or even higher primary
transposition ratios over time resulting in a mean primary transposition ra-
tio of e.g. 0.31 for Finland (FIN). This may hint at the proposed eﬀect of
national sector importance on primary transposition ratios according to H 3.
Both, Austria and the Scandinavian countries, generally have a high stake in
these two sectors of their national economies. Value added shares (vash) for
both of these sectors are among the highest across EU-15 countries whereas
for Germany’s economy these sectors seem to play a subordinate role (see
Table 7 for details on vash).
As said before, for directives touching upon energy/ environment issues



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I, Agriculture I, Energy/Env. I, Industry I, Transport I, Finance I, Pub./Soc.
L, Agriculture L, Energy/Env. L, Industry L, Transport L, Finance L, Pub./Soc.






Graphs by country code and sector code
Figure 7: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Italy (I),



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F, Agriculture F, Energy/Env. F, Industry F, Transport F, Finance F, Pub./Soc.
D, Agriculture D, Energy/Env. D, Industry D, Transport D, Finance D, Pub./Soc.






Graphs by country code and sector code
Figure 8: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for France



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DK, Agriculture DK, Energy/Env. DK, Industry DK, Transport DK, Finance DK, Pub./Soc.
FIN, Agriculture FIN, Energy/Env. FIN, Industry FIN, Transport FIN, Finance FIN, Pub./Soc.






Graphs by country code and sector code
Figure 9: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Denmark



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B, Agriculture B, Energy/Env. B, Industry B, Transport B, Finance B, Pub./Soc.
IR, Agriculture IR, Energy/Env. IR, Industry IR, Transport IR, Finance IR, Pub./Soc.






Graphs by country code and sector code
Figure 10: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Belgium
(B), Ireland (IR) and Austria (A)
23France (F) and Denmark (DK) stand out of our country sample with simi-
larly high mean values of .29, .40, .26 and .37. With respect to our theoretical
suspicions, relatively high primary transposition ratios for the energy/ en-
vironment sector may seem surprising as value added shares are generally
quite low in all national economies. Our regression analysis will have to re-
veal whether a high number of technical obligations for implementing direc-
tives in this policy area inserts a causal eﬀect on the government’s preference
to transpose via parliament or whether the particularly strong inﬂuence of
lobby groups in this sector may make the government to preferentially opt
for primary transposition instruments. Regarding primary transposition dy-
namics, ﬁgures 8, 10 and 9 also show diﬀerences in timing for this policy
area: whereas B and D reveal peak primary transposition ratios for most
years after 1995, F and particularly DK reach peak values for the early 90s.
Following H 4, diﬀerent policy cycles in B, D, F and DK as well as diﬀerent
government constellations may be accountable.
4.3 Independent variables
4.3.1 Sector characteristics
According to the literature on sector diversiﬁcation (see e. g. Imbs (2003)),
we straightforwardly take value added shares (vash) as indicator for sector
size. Assuming that a larger sector size indicates greater economic and thus
political importance of a sector we expect a positive eﬀect on primary trans-
position according to H3. Looking at Table 7 in the appendix, cross-country
and cross-sector variations in sector sizes and sector developments over time
become apparent at ﬁrst sight: Generally speaking, the three most impor-
tant sectors of all economies are the aggregate ﬁnancial and public and social
services as well as total manufacturing industries. Out of these, ﬁnance has
taken the lead in all member states except for public and social services in
Denmark, Spain and Sweden and total manufacturing industries in Finland
and Ireland. Following these are transport services (including storage) with
relatively high shares in Sweden (5.7% in 1994), Denmark (5.6% in 2002)
and Finland (7% in 2002). Although trends seem rather similar for these
aggregate sectors across EU members, levels diﬀer markedly and conﬁrm
the structural changes from industrial to service societies taking place in the
member states over the last two decades. Regarding the smaller sectors of EU
economies, health and social work as well as public administration services
and construction amount to noticeable shares across members diﬀering how-
ever in growth rates and absolute levels. Besides these, transport and storage
industries play an important role in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
24group/ sector
characteristics








– public and social ser-
vices, industry
Table 1: Sector classiﬁcation according to Olson’s (1965) group theory
Sweden and Finland) and Greece. The energy/ environment sector generally
seems to play a minor role regarding the size of value added shares as an
indicator for sector importance. Shares remain relatively constant between
2% and 4% across member states. According to Imbs (2003), employment
shares (empsh) are frequently applied as alternative measure for sector size.
We will thus replace vash by empsh in some of our model speciﬁcations. As
for vash, data for empsh stems from the OECD STAN indicators 2002.
In the lack of data on the number of lobby groups active in a particular
sector per country, we account for the potential national inﬂuence of lobby
groups across sectors of the national economies by adding a dummy variable
lobby to our model speciﬁcation. In Table 1 below we follow Olson’s (1965)
group theory to distinguish sectors with a generally higher potential for lob-
bying activities from sectors with a generally lower potential for lobbying
activities. According to Olsen (1965), sectors with high interest speciﬁcity
and smaller group size have a generally higher potential to organize as sectors
in the other categories and are accordingly coded as 1. This is, of course, a
very crude measure of sector-speciﬁc lobby eﬀects. Future research should
clearly aim for a more precise indicator in order to test H5.
Regarding H6, we create a dummy variable technic accounting for policy
areas with a potentially higher number of directives referring to technical
obligations for implementation. Looking at the sectors in our sample, trans-
port and energy and environment appear to be the rather technical ones and
are accordingly coded with 1. As, by construction, technic correlates highly
with lobby we will only add one at a time to our basic estimation model m1
in Table 3.
4.3.2 Political-institutional country-speciﬁc features
Testing H1, we include the variable vps of Tsebelis’ online dataset suppos-
ing that more veto players may hinder the government to choose primary
legislative transposition devices. The number of veto player variable thereby
entails the number of coalition parties, but goes beyond it by adding systemic
features hindering the legislative process.
25According to H2a and H2b two types of measures assess the strengths
of national governments in our empirical analysis. The ﬁrst class of indi-
cators tries to capture the position of a government within the respective
executive-legislative relationship. Speciﬁcally, govcontrol indicates a govern-
ment’s agenda-control in parliamentary (legislative) decision-making. Data
stems from D¨ oring (1995). Note for the interpretation of our estimation
results that higher scores on govcontrol refer to less control of the parliamen-
tary agenda by the government. Second, we turn to coalition governments in
more detail and take the fracionalisation index fraccab from the Cusack/ En-
gelhardt ﬁle collection (2002) as indicator for the degree of fractionalisation
within a government. The more coalition parties, i.e. the more fractionalised
and weaker a government, the generally less legislative output according to
Kreppel (1997)’s analysis and H2b. Due to their contextual correlation we
either add vps or fraccab to our model speciﬁcation, but not both at the same
time.
Following D¨ oring (2004), H4 considers policy cycles to play a role for
the government’s transposition decision. In order to broadly test the eﬀect
of policy cycles we include a dummy variable election for years in which a
parliamentary election takes place in a speciﬁc country. Data stems from the
variable wahldatu in the Cusack/Engelhardt ﬁle collection (2002).
4.3.3 EU membership beneﬁts
Assessing the economic beneﬁts stemming from EU membership in proposi-
tion H7, we add a variable neteureceipts. It measures the yearly amount of
ﬁscal transfers a country is receiving from Brussels minus its budgetary con-
tributions to the EU. Thus, in line with Perkins & Neumayer (2007) we opt
for net EU transfers rather than for the sum of mere EU transfers, supposing
that it is the fact of being a ‘net EU recipient’ or a ‘net EU payer’ that makes
a diﬀerence for a country’s transposition rationale. Data was collected from
the respective German statistical yearbooks published by DeStatis.
4.3.4 Control variables
Besides our main explanatory variables testing H1-H7, we include control
variables to our basic model speciﬁcation accounting for additional systemic,
macroeconomic and EU-level inﬂuences.
On top of the veto player variable, we insert personal to our model in
order to control for system inherent features fostering the level of parlia-
mentary fragmentation. More precisely personal, indicates the inﬂuence of
the personal vote in a voting system according to Hallerberg (2004). It is
26an index ranging from 0.2 for The Netherlands to 7.6 for Finland. Haller-
berg (2004) argues that the more personalized a voting system is, the greater
its parliamentary fragmentation. We thus expect a positive relationship be-
tween voting systems with a high inﬂuence of the personal vote and primary
transposition ratios as in more fragmented parliaments eﬀective opposition
in plenary would probably become more diﬃcult.
We additionally include logged gdppcr ln in real terms in order to account
for the relative wealth of a country. gdppcr ln controls for the alternative
hypothesis that administrations of wealthier countries are more developed
and more eﬀective and thus able to generally transpose more.
Finally, alternatively to our two measures of sector size vash and empsh,
we add labour costs per employee, labemp, to assess a sector’s national eco-
nomic importance. Data stems from the OECD STAN Indicators 2002.
4.4 Estimation model and method
Linking theory to practice, we opt for a generalized linear regression model
(GLM) and the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) suggested by
Papke and Wooldridge (1996). We ﬁnd this particular model speciﬁcation
and estimation method adequate for our data structure, especially for dealing
with our bounded fractional dependent variable COLI. The standard way of
handling this kind of dependent variable would be a log-odds transformation
of the dependent variable: log(y/(1 − y)). However, clearly, this approach
does not allow for the dependent variable to be equal to zero or one without
further data adjustments. Since our dataset contains many observations on
the extremes and especially on zero, Papke and Wooldridge’s GLM and QML
estimation method seems to be preferable (see Papke & Wooldridge (1996)).
Additional properties of our sample such as its unbalancedness including
a large number of missing values of our dependent variable as well as its
time-series structure turned out to be less problematic when taking a closer
look at the data. In particular, selection bias does not seem to be a real
problem as only 22 of the 157 missing observations of our dependent variable
are due to non-notiﬁcation of transposition instruments11. All other missing
observations indicate that there have been no directives adopted in Brus-
sels needing to be transposed by a member state in a particular sector. As
mentioned above, this is the case for Austria, Finland and Sweden before
1995, i.e. their oﬃcial admission date. The 22 non-notiﬁcations further seem
to be distributed randomly among member states and sectors as descriptive
11In our dataset non-notiﬁcation of transposition instruments is indicated by anzcoyr2
== 0.
27statistics have shown. Thus, in the case of random selection we do not need
to fear selection bias.
Regarding the time-series structure of our data, we have further tested
for a dynamic model speciﬁcation and estimated standard Arellano & Bond
(1991) dynamic panel regressions. These have revealed that the dynamic ef-
fects in our data are not pronounced as the lagged dependent variable turned
out insigniﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations for the one-step Arellano/Bond
(1991) estimations. This conﬁrms our model choice, viz. the aforemen-
tioned three-dimensional generalized linear model (GLM) which Papke &
Wooldridge (1996) formulate as the regression:
E(yijt|xijt,zjt) = G(xijtβ,zjtγ) (1)
where j = 1,...,15 is the index denoting the member states, i = 1,...,5
that for economic sectors and t = 1,...,16, indicates years, as described
above in detail. xijt is the vector of our set of independent sector speciﬁc
variables12 varying across countries and sectors as well as time in the case
of vash, empsh and labemp. zjt stands for our set of politico-institutional
and macroeconomic independent variables13 diﬀering only across countries
and time except for the time-invariant dummy variables, i.e. election. β
and γ indicate the two corresponding sets of parameters to be estimated.
Following Papke & Wooldridge (1996), G(·) is a known function satisfying
0 < G(δ) < 1 for all δ ∈ < ensuring that the predicted values of yijt
lies within [0,1] . Importantly, equation (1) is well deﬁned even if yijt
takes on 0 or 1 with positive probability. Usually, G(·) is decided to be a
cumulative distribution function (cdf), which most frequently is either the
logistic function or the standard normal cdf. In our case we opt for the
probit function as the logistic one led to numerical convergence problems for
some of our model speciﬁcations. The error term entailed by (1) is deﬁned
implicitly by E(εijt|xijt,zit) = 0 . Further, we add a constant β0 into our
regression as well a linear time trend to control for the non-stationarity of
our macroeconomic independent variables.
The coeﬃcients β and γ in (1) can consistently be estimated via non-linear
least squares (NLS). However, according to Papke & Wooldridge (1996),
heteroscedasticity is likely to be present since V ar(yijt|xijt,zjt) is unlikely
to be constant when yijt ∈ [0,1] and thus NLS is not eﬃcient. Papke &
Wooldridge (1996) therefore suggest quasi-maximum likelihood estimation




28lijt(β,γ) ≡ yijt log[G(xijtβ,zjtγ)] + (1 − yijt)log[1 − G(xijtβ,zjtγ)]. (2)










This estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the
distribution of yijt conditional on xijt,zit . Further, it is eﬃcient, see Papke
& Wooldridge (1996). In order to additionally account for heteroscedasticity
of unknown form, we use robust standard errors in all model speciﬁcations
presented in Tables 2 and 3.
All our estimations were carried out in STATA 8.2 applying the xtgee-
command for generalized linear panel estimation. We specify a binomial
distribution for our dependent variable, a probit link function and an inde-
pendent within-group correlation structure.
5 Empirical results
Having discussed our particular GLM model and the appropriate QLME-
estimator following Papke & Wooldridge (1996), let us turn to our estima-
tion results. Tables 6 and 10 in the appendix give an overview on variable
deﬁnitions, data sources and summary statistics which might be useful for
following our interpretations. Tables 2 and 3 below displays the estimated
eﬀects of our diverse political-economic variables on primary to total trans-
position ratios across countries and sectors. Table 2 includes netEUreceipts
to the modelspeciﬁcations displayed in 3. We chose to display two separate
tables as the number of observations changes remarkably in models m1n to
m6n, i.e. when netEUreceipts is added to models m1 to m6. Models m1
and m1n are the respective basic models. Due to their strong correlation,
we subsequently add the sector characteristics vash, empsh, lobby and tech-
nic. In addition to the models presented in Tables 2 and 3, we provide
further estimation results in our STATA do-ﬁles which are available from
the author upon request. These contain speciﬁcations including the number
of veto players vps, a dummy for bicameral systems as well as legal system
dummies. As these variables have turned out insigniﬁcant (except for the
German and Common law dummy which is not surprising according to the
earlier provided descriptive statistics for the UK, Ireland, Austria and Ger-
many), we leave them aside in our ﬁnal model speciﬁcations presented in 2
and 3.
29coli m1n m2n m3n m4n m5n m6n
fraccab 0.396 0.403 0.379 0.389 0.444 * 0.462 **
(0.247) (0.246) (0.252) (0.251) (0.247) (0.236)
govcontrol 0.094 ** 0.092 ** 0.100 ** 0.100 ** 0.096 ** 0.100 ***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.037)
election -0.103 * -0.104 * -0.097 -0.098 -0.094 -0.098
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
neteureceipts -2.55e-05 * -2.55e-05 * -2.70e-05 ** -2.72e-05 ** -2.77e-05 *** -2.68e-05 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
empsh 0 .008 * -0.003 -0.042 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
labemp 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
personal -0.032 -0.032 -0.035 -0.035 -0.042 -0.043
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
gdppcrln 0.746 *** 0.740 *** 0.813 *** 0.813 *** 0.659 *** 0.622 ***
(0.255) (0.256) (0.257) (0.255) (0.238) (0.235)
year 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
vash 0.006 -0.008 -0.048 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
technic -0.567 ** -0.694 ***
(0.254) (0.249)
lobby -1.587 *** -1.508 ***
(0.354) (0.333)
cons -28.475 -27.982 -26.281 -25.448 -28.961 -29.090
(28.567) (28.853) (27.908) (27.864) (23.959) (23.368)
N of obs 665 666 665 666 665 666
N of groups (country * sector) 71 72 71 71 71 72
Obs per group (avg) 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3
WALD chi2 80.573 77.464 78.516 80.401 117.100 125.283
Table 2: Generalized estimation equation results: including net EU receipts
30coli m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
fraccab 0.465 * 0.483 * 0.436 * 0.454 * 0.504 ** 0.545 **
(0.260) (0.262) (0.259) (0.258) (0.253) (0.232)
govcontrol 0.089 ** 0.085 ** 0.095 ** 0.095 ** 0.091 ** 0.095 ***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.034)
election -0.111 ** -0.111 ** -0.108 ** -0.108 ** -0.107 * -0.108 *
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
empsh 0.008 * -0.002 -0.043 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
labemp 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
personal -0.056 * -0.056 * -0.059 * -0.059 * -0.068 ** -0.069 **
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
gdppcrln 0.898 *** 0.880 *** 0.975 *** 0.969 *** 0.827 *** 0.773 ***
(0.244) (0.246) (0.249) (0.245) (0.223) (0.214)
year 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
vash 0.005 -0.009 -0.053 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
technic -0.570 ** -0.724 ***
(0.270) (0.259)
lobby -1.610 *** -1.617 ***
(0.395) (0.329)
cons -26.100 -25.690 -23.263 -22.182 -26.567 -26.680
(28.919) (29.170) (27.997) (27.763) (24.012) (23.098)
N of obs 740 742 740 742 740 742
N of groups (country * sector) 72 72 72 72 72 72
Obs per group (avg) 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
WALD chi2 76.230 74.492 81.120 87.030 96.478 108.475
Table 3: Generalized estimation equation results: excluding net EU receipts;
Notes: Displayed are estimated coeﬃcients; asterisks (***, **, *) indicate
signiﬁcance at the usual 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Both STATA
do-ﬁles and the dataset are available from the author upon request. We use
robust standard errors and include a linear time trend throughout.
31Looking at the estimated coeﬃcients of models m1n-m6n and m1-m6 we
ﬁnd the estimated coeﬃcient signs and sizes to be quite robust across spec-
iﬁcations. Only the estimated coeﬃcients of value added and employment
shares (vash and empsh) remarkably change their signs and signiﬁcance lev-
els across speciﬁcations. Apparently, controlling for certain sector speciﬁc
eﬀects, such as group size and interest speciﬁcity in the case of lobby or tech-
nicality of a sector in the case of technic aﬀects the estimated coeﬃcient
sizes and signs of our sector size measures. Further, some of our political-
institutional variables, i.e. fraccab and personal as well as election become
statistically insigniﬁcant when adding neteureceipts. This may be due to a
non-random reduction of our sample size. Overall, however, the model ﬁt
seems reasonably high looking at the sizes of the chi2-tests against the null
hypothesis of all coeﬃcients being zero.
Feeling reasonably satisﬁed with the validity of our statistical analysis,
we proceed to interpreting the estimated coeﬃcient signs and signiﬁcance
levels corresponding to our theoretical propositions H1-H7. First, regarding
political-institutional eﬀects on primary to total transposition ratios, we ﬁnd
parliamentary agenda-control by the government, govcontrol, to insert the
contra-intuitive negative signiﬁcant eﬀect proposed by D¨ oring (1995) and
Henning (1995) and formulated in H2a (remember that higher scores on
govcontrol indicate less governmental control of the parliamentary agenda).
Governments with a strong position in the national executive-legislative re-
lationship apparently seem to opt less for transposition via parliament than
their weaker counterparts. Further, against our proposition H2b, the eﬀect
of cabinet fractionalisation fraccab on primary transposition ratio turned out
positive and signiﬁcant (except for the models in Table 2). This is, however,
well in line with our result on H2a and further strengthens D¨ oring and Hen-
ning’s (1995) argument. Further surprising on ﬁrst sight, but in line with
these results is a negative eﬀect of a high score on the personal voting index
personal. Apparently, the more fragmented the national parliament the less
the government chooses primary legislation for transposition.
Above this, policy cycles seem to play a statistically signiﬁcant role in
most speciﬁcations. Corresponding to H4, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of election
on primary transposition ratios. In years in which a parliamentary election
takes place, member states apparently transpose less via primary legislation.
It remains to mention with respect to the anticipated political-institutional
eﬀects that H1 cannot be approved by our empirical investigation. The es-
timated coeﬃcient of the number of veto-players vps turned out with the
anticipated negative sign but insigniﬁcant and therefore has been left aside
in the ﬁnal model speciﬁcations displayed in Tables 2 and 3. STATA-do-ﬁles
containing these results are, however, available from the author upon request.
32With respect to economic sector characteristics, we ﬁnd value added
shares vash and employment shares empsh to assert the anticipated posi-
tive and, in the case of empsh, signiﬁcant eﬀect on primary transposition
ratios according to H3. However, when controlling for technical sectors, i.e.
energy/ environment and transport, or sectors with a high potential for lob-
bying activities, i.e. agriculture, energy/ environment and transport, both
of the estimated coeﬃcients change their signs and become highly signiﬁcant
(see models 2 and 3). The estimated negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of
technic and lobby further support hypotheses H5 and H6. However, our mea-
sures for testing H5 and H6 are quite crude making these variables and their
interaction with vash and empsh diﬃcult to interpret. Data quality thus
needs to be improved before ﬁnally judging hypotheses H3, H5 and H6. In-
teresting to note is a positive and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect of our alternative
measure of sector importance, i.e. sectoral labour compensation labemp.
Regarding EU-membership beneﬁts, we notice primary transposition ra-
tios to decrease the more net transfers a member state receives from the EU.
Apparently, net EU receivers prefer transposition via secondary legislative
devices, are less prone against transposition delays (see K¨ onig et al. (2005))
and infringement procedures (see Perkins & Neumayer (2007)).
Finally, a country’s general wealth approxied by gdppcr ln seems to pos-
itively aﬀect the ratio of primary to total transpositions.
6 Conclusions
Our study on the member state government’s transposition decision reveals
that all three hypothesized factors matter for explaining a government’s
transposition rationale: politico-institutional constellations, economic sector
characteristics as well as EU membership beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
primary to total transposition ratios decrease with the strength of a govern-
ment, both relative to opposition in parliament and within the government
coalition. Governments further seem to opt less for primary transposition
devices towards the end of an election period and if they are a ‘net-recipient’
of EU transfers. Wealthier countries, however, generally transpose more via
parliament. Regarding policy areas, we ﬁnd that governments prefer sec-
ondary transposition for directives touching upon technical sectors or sec-
tors with a high lobbying potential. For directives touching upon sectors
with high labour compensations per employee governments, however, seem
to preferably choose primary transposition devices. Our main sector charac-
teristic, i.e. sector importance, came out playing a signiﬁcant role for primary
transposition ratios in most model speciﬁcations though the direction of the
33eﬀect still needs to be further speciﬁed.
These results are innovative since, so far, the transposition and imple-
mentation literature lacks a cross-sector view on national transposition per-
formances – though cross-sector analyses on the issue of EU law implemen-
tation are common in practitioners’ publications as the EU Commission’s
Internal Market Scoreboard. Looking at the results of our ﬁrst attempt of a
cross-sector panel investigation on the government’s choice of transposition
instrument, strongly suggests paying more attention to sector-speciﬁc eﬀects
in this research area. Proceeding with single-sector (cross-) national stud-
ies one risks selection bias and having a tunnel vision in explaining member
states’ transposition patterns.
With respect to theory, constructing a full theoretical model explaining
ﬁrst a government’s general willingness to transpose EU directives and sec-
ond a government’s choice of transposition instrument remains an exercise
left to future research. Although desirable, this was beyond the scope of
our empirically focussed study. However, our empirical results may serve to
motivate eﬀorts in enhancing theory on these issues. Hopefully, we assist
this endeavour by providing a framework structuring the government’s deci-
sion path and sketching its utility function when it comes to implementing
a directive received from Brussels. In this regard, it might further be worth-
while thinking of possible interaction eﬀects between political-institutional
and economic sector characteristics, such as government strength and sector
saliency.
Concluding, we would like to remark on possible improvements of our
data quality and applied econometrics. Besides our eﬀort in presenting a
sound projection of the transposition reality, our empirical analysis is lim-
ited by the need to collect the data within a reasonable time frame. Fu-
ture studies should clearly aim at constructing a comprehensive index for
’government strength’ according to an elaborated, clear-cut theoretical argu-
ment, improving measures on sector-speciﬁc lobbying potential and adding
EU-level characteristics of directives such as word count, initiating institu-
tion and decision-time taken. The categorization of our dependent variable
should be worked on and the ’grey-zone’ between primary and secondary
transposition instruments further analysed and speciﬁed. With respect to
our estimations, future analysis could specify the error variance structure
directly as an alternative to our use of robust standard errors. This would
be a means for modelling theoretically plausible group eﬀects inherent to our
data structure. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd our results useful in that they may
open the door to a new political-economic, cross-sector dimension in studies
on EU law transposition and implementation by the member states, both









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vps H1 - Number of veto players Tsebelis, G. online dataset:
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/
govcontrol H2a - Government control of plenary agenda index
ranging from 1 “The government alone deter-
mines the plenary agenda” to 7 “The Chamber
itself determines the agenda”
D¨ oring (1995 a: Table 7.1)
fraccabv H2b - Index of fractionalization of cabinet, ranging
from 0 to 0.78.
Cusack/ Engelhardt (2002): The PGL
File Collection
election H4 - Dummy variable where 1 indicates a parlia-
mentary election in this year for a speciﬁc
member state; data on election dates stems
from the variable wahldatu
Cusack/ Engelhardt (2002): The PGL
File Collection
economic sector characteristics
vash H3 + Value added shares relative to the total econ-
omy; each industry’s value added as a percent-
age of value added for the total economy
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
empsh H3 + Employment shares in the total economy;
shows each industry’s employment as a per-
centage of employment for the total economy.
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
technic H5 - Dummy for technical sectors where 1 indicates
a technical sector, i.e. transport and energy/
environment
Own data
lobby H6 - Dummy for sectors with high potential for
lobbying activities according to Olson’s group




neteureceipts H7 + Netrec-Netpay: Net EU Revenues - Net EU
Payments; total billions German Mark (DM)
DeStatis: Statistisches Jahrbuch 2002
control variables
personal + Personal vote index indicating the relative in-
centives of a given system for the personal vote
ranging from 0.2 to 7.6 for 18 European states.
D¨ oring/ Hallerberg (2004: Table 1.2)
labemp + Labour compensation per employee for the to-
tal economy; ratio of labour compensation for
a particular industry to the number engaged
divided by the ratio of labour compensation
for the total economy to the number of per-
sons engaged for the total economy
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
bicam + Dummy variable for bicameral vs. unicameral
legislatures
CIA: The World Factbook 2005
gdppcr ln + GDP per capita in real terms Eurostat
Table 6: Operationalisation and data sources for independent variables
374 most important sectors vash per year in % change in % additional sectors vash per year in % change in %
1986 1994 2000 1986 1994 2000
Italy Italy
Finance 19.52 22.7 26.02 6.5 Agriculture 4.4 3.2 2.6 -1.8
Industry 42.35 38.81 37.03 -5.32 Transport 5.64 5.66 5.09 -0.55
Public and social services 17.15 18.72 18.55 1.4 Enerty/ Enviroment 1.8 2.32 2.16 0.36
Luxembourg Luxembourg
Finance 32.2 38.9 44.4 12.2 Agriculture 1.87 1 0.68 -1.19
Public and social services 15.78 16.3 14.7 -1.08 Transport .. .. .. ..
Industry 36.53 27.08 23.03 -13.5 Enerty/ Enviroment 3.24 2.67 2.12 -1.12
The Netherlands The Netherlands
Finance 18.3 22.5 26.4 8.1 Agriculture 4.38 3.59 2.77 -1.61
Public and social services 24.3 23.4 22.08 -2.22 Transport 4.8 4.98 4.75 -0.05
Industry 33.4 32.9 31.24 -2.16 Enerty/ Enviroment 2.22 1.93 1.46 -0.76
Portugal Portugal
Public and social services 17.4 23.4 .. 6 Agriculture 9.4 5.2 .. -4.2
Industry 43.25 37.87 .. -5.38 Transport 5.6 3.7 .. -1.9
Finance 13.5 17.8 .. 4.3 Enerty/ Enviroment 2.93 3.32 .. 0.39
Sweden Sweden
Public and social services .. 24.5 24.39 -0.11 Transport 5.8 5.7 5.7 -0.1
Finance 19.2 23.7 24.6 5.4 Agriculture 3.99 2.7 1.9 -2.09
Industry 35.4 32.8 34.2 -1.2 Enerty/ Enviroment 3.2 3.3 2.4 -0.8
UK UK
Finance 20.1 24.2 27.2 7.1 Agriculture 2.08 1.68 1.02 -1.06
Public and social services 15.28 21.77 21.61 6.33 Enerty/ Enviroment 2.93 7.26 6.3 3.37
Industry 36.7 34.7 32.34 -4.36 Transport 5.2 5 4.9 -0.3
Austria Austria
Finance 16.6 20 23.6 7 Agriculture 3.8 2.7 2.3 -1.5
Industry 22.7 19.4 20.5 -2.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 21 22 19.8 -1.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Belgium Belgium
Finance 21.4 25.5 27.9 6.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 24.1 24 24.6 0.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 22.5 19.6 1.7 -3.8 .. .. .. .. ..
Germany Germany
Finance 22 26.9 .. 4.9 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 30.6 23.1 .. -7.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 19.8 21.4 .. 1.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Denmark Denmark
Public and social services 24.5 26.7 26.6 2.1 Transport 4.9 5.4 5.6 0.7
Finance 20.7 23.4 24.3 3.6 Agriculture 5 3.3 2.3 -2.7
Industry 18.5 16.8 15.6 -2.9 .. .. .. .. ..
Spain Spain
Public and social services 17.8 20.6 20.4 2.6 Agriculture 5.8 4.7 3.2 -2.6
Finance 17.6 18.5 20 2.4 Transport and storage 5.7 5.5 .. -0.2
Industry 23.8 18.3 16.8 -7 .. .. .. .. ..
Finland Finland
Industry 24.1 23.6 23.5 -0.6 Transport and storage 6.7 7.5 7 0.3
Public and social services 21.1 23.3 21.6 0.5 Agriculture 6.7 5.2 3.5 -3.2
Finance 15.7 19.1 21.4 5.7 .. .. .. .. ..
France France
Finance 24.6 28.2 30.5 5.9 Health and social work 5.6 6.5 6.8 1.2
Public and social services 21.4 23 23.7 2.3 Construction 5.7 5.5 4.9 -0.8
Industry 32.1 18.3 17.5 -14.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Greece Greece
Finance 15.2 20.6 21.2 6 .. 11.5 10.4 7 -4.5
Public and social services 16.9 19.5 21.1 4.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 17.8 14 11.8 -6 .. .. .. .. ..
Ireland Ireland
Industry 26.1 27.1 32.9 6.8 Agriculture 10 8.5 3.5 -6.5
Finance 16.8 16.4 20.2 3.4 .. .. .. .. ..
Community 19.2 21.2 16.2 -3 .. .. .. .. ..
Table 7: Value added shares of six selected industries across EU-15 member
states 1986-2002, Source: OECD STAN Indicators 2002
38country variable obs mean std. dev. min max
B coli 83 .1701218 .2080417 0 .8
F coli 84 .1971875 .2240417 0 .8
D coli 84 .3489636 .295219 0 1
IR coli 82 .0690498 .1575556 0 .8
UK coli 84 .0102603 .0520107 0 .375
A coli 39 .4533133 .3235506 0 1
DK coli 83 .2395225 .249219 0 .8333333
FIN coli 39 .3278127 .264762 0 1
GR coli 84 .0537253 .1228025 0 .5
I coli 83 .1048001 .1780646 0 1
L coli 83 .1699333 .2198178 0 .8333333
N coli 83 .2405997 .2492182 0 1
P coli 85 .0483779 .1309674 0 1
SP coli 84 .1742519 .205014 0 .6666667
SW coli 38 .1976922 .2574886 0 1
Table 8: Summary statistics for DV per country
sector variable obs mean std. dev. min max
agriculture coli 228 .0542153 .0980554 0 .4444444
energy/ environment coli 226 .2285837 .2616996 0 1
industry coli 228 .0912993 .0923686 0 .4545455
transport coli 211 .1044216 .2046249 0 1
pub./ soc. services coli 225 .3712976 .2915643 0 1
Table 9: Summary statistics for DV per sector
39country sector variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Belgium (B): agriculture coli 17 .0200993 .0369066 0 .1304348
energy/ environment coli 17 .2928571 .2355369 0 .6666667
industry coli 17 .1021314 .0544342 .0322581 .2105263
transport coli 15 .0349495 .089064 0 .3333333
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .3846693 .2102513 0 .8
France (F): agriculture coli 17 .1054094 .1067905 0 .3
energy/ environment coli 17 .2610644 .2674043 0 .8
industry coli 17 .1193076 .0854179 0 .2857143
transport coli 16 .0340278 .0875331 0 .3333333
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .4565307 .2125638 0 .75
Germany (D): agriculture coli 17 .2168065 .1226996 0 .3793103
energy/ environment coli 17 .395098 .3053188 0 .8
industry coli 17 .1925789 .1475079 0 .4545455
transport coli 16 .2510417 .3302899 0 1
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .6835327 .2109072 .3333333 1
Ireland (IR): agriculture coli 17 .0098039 .0279937 0 .0952381
energy/ environment coli 17 .1107843 .2235246 0 .8
industry coli 17 .0301415 .0290875 0 .0833333
transport coli 15 .0083333 .0322749 0 .125
pub./ soc. services coli 16 .1859172 .2282997 0 .75
United Kingdom (UK): agriculture coli 17 .0021008 .008662 0 .0357143
energy/ environment coli 17 .0465686 .1101238 0 .375
industry coli 17 .0020284 .0083633 0 .0344828
transport coli 16 0 0 0 0
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0 0 0 0
Austria (A): agriculture coli 8 .269479 .0905388 .125 .4117647
energy/ environment coli 8 .5297619 .3420863 0 .8571429
industry coli 8 .1746913 .0751742 .0869565 .32
transport coli 7 .3959493 .2708097 0 .8571429
pub./ soc. services coli 8 .8895147 .1406809 .6666667 1
Denmark (DK): agriculture coli 17 .0358904 .0534059 0 .1428571
energy/ environment coli 16 .3708085 .2636488 0 .75
industry coli 17 .1511424 .0923578 0 .3809524
transport coli 16 .1666667 .2441159 0 .75
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .4765416 .2265119 0 .8333333
Finland (FIN): agriculture coli 8 .1416425 .126647 .0588235 .4444444
energy/ environment coli 8 .4108631 .2982072 0 .8571429
industry coli 8 .1769223 .0867624 .0666667 .3076923
transport coli 8 .3059562 .2399388 0 .6666667
pub./ soc. services coli 7 .6430891 .2078016 .4285714 1
Greece (GR): agriculture coli 17 .003268 .0134742 0 .0555556
energy/ environment coli 17 .0656863 .1385027 0 .5
industry coli 17 .0332066 .0432659 0 .125
transport coli 16 .0208333 .0833333 0 .3333333
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .1436975 .1936381 0 .5
Italy (I): agriculture coli 17 .0374134 .0813442 0 .2857143
energy/ environment coli 17 .220028 .3088604 0 1
industry coli 17 .0484386 .0470755 0 .1428571
transport coli 15 .0622222 .120097 0 .3333333
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .1508891 .1392356 0 .4285714
Luxembourg (L): agriculture coli 17 .0065962 .0188584 0 .0645161
energy/ environment coli 17 .2172969 .2305993 0 .7142857
industry coli 17 .0772761 .062011 0 .2121212
transport coli 15 .085 .1455081 0 .4
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .453505 .1992053 0 .8333333
The Netherlands (N): agriculture coli 17 .0751759 .1019544 0 .3333333
energy/ environment coli 17 .2547152 .2384973 0 .75
industry coli 17 .1246486 .0808863 0 .3181818
transport coli 15 .2494805 .2767577 0 1
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .5000233 .249641 0 1
Portugal (P): agriculture coli 17 .003268 .0134742 0 .0555556
energy/ environment coli 17 .0182073 .0515693 0 .1666667
industry coli 17 .0417493 .0457846 0 .1818182
transport coli 17 .0735294 .2462961 0 1
pub./soc. services coli 17 .1051354 .1310752 0 .4444444
Spain (SP): agriculture coli 17 .0178223 .0231801 0 .0625
energy/ environment coli 17 .2550654 .1925189 0 .5714286
industry coli 17 .0794373 .0656393 0 .2272727
transport coli 16 .0473958 .0812927 0 .25
pub./ soc. services coli 17 .4640766 .1486564 .2 .6666667
Sweden (SW): agriculture coli 8 0 0 0 0
energy/ environment coli 7 .2666667 .2099383 0 .5
industry coli 8 .1209824 .1314862 0 .4285714
transport coli 8 .0805556 .1262329 0 .3333333
pub./ soc. services coli 7 .5761905 .2740061 .2 1
Table 10: Summary statistics for DV per country and sector
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